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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of the Case

This appeal arises from the District Court's dismissal of pro se plaintiffappellant Mark Colafranceschi's Second Amended Verified Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial against Ashley Robinson on Ms. Robinson's motion to dismiss
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Appellant Colafranceschi's
Second Amended Complaint asserted causes of action for defamation and
professional malpractice related to Ms. Robinson's performance as a court-appointed
child custody evaluator. The District Court found that the claims asserted in the
Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on
the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity and Colafranceschi's failure to plead facts
constituting misrepresentation with sufficient specificity. Appellant Colafranceschi
appeals both the District Court's dismissal of his action and the District Court's
denial of appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration related thereto.

B.

Procedural History

The initial complaint in this matter was filed on November 16, 2012, (Record
("R.") at 9-34), and was subsequently amended by the Amended Verified Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial ("First Amended Complaint"), filed on December 6,
2012. (R. at 35-52.)
Following service, appellee Robinson filed a motion to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint, on January 16, 2013. (R. at 321.) Following briefing upon
Robinson's motion, along with defendant-appellee Shawn Briley's and defendant
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Kim Batt-Lincoln's similar motions, argument was held on April 15, 2013. (See

generally, Transcript, April 15, 2013, ("April Tr.")). At hearing, the District Court
granted appellee Robinson's motion to dismiss, directing submission of a second
amended complaint to set forth "specific facts of fraud or misrepresentation in
obtaining the appointment" as child custody evaluator. (April Tr. 11. 36:22-37:6.) A
related Order was subsequently issued on April 30, 2013. (R. at 293-295.) 1
The Second Amended Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
("Second Amended Complaint") was filed on April 25, 2013.

(R. at 142-286.)

Appellee Robinson subsequently filed her Renewed Motion to Dismiss on May 7,
2013. (R. at 422-423.) Following briefing,2 argument was held on June 17, 2013. 3

(See generally, Transcript, Jun 17, 2013 ("June Tr.")). The Court thereafter issued
its written Order Dismissing the Second Amended Verified Complaint on
September 16, 2013, on the grounds of quasi-judicial immunity and failure to
sufficiently plead misrepresentation. (R. at 296-299.)
Appellant Colafranceschi then filed his Motion to Reconsider Order
Dismissing Claim on September 24, 2013, (R. at 300-306.)

After briefing, the

District Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, and related
Judgment, on November 5, 2013. (R. at 307-310.)
Appellant Colafranceschi filed his Notice of Appeal on December 13, 2013.

1 Neither the order dismissing appellant Colafranceschi's First Amended Complaint and requiring
submission of a further amended complaint, nor the dismissal of defendant Batt-Lincoln, have been
appealed by appellant Colafranceschi.
2 While appellant Colafranceschi filed a "Motion to Strike" regarding the renewed motions to
dismiss, appellant failed to otherwise submit a written opposition to appellant Robinson's Renewed
Motion to Dismiss prior to the hearing on that motion. (See generally, R. at 7; June Tr., at 11. 70:7-9.)
3 Appellee Briley's renewed motion to dismiss was also addressed at the June 7, 2013, hearing.
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(R. at 313-315.)

C.

Statement of Facts4

"On review of a district court's I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court views
all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Allied Bail
Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409, 258 P.3d 340, 344 (2011). With
this admonition in mind, the "facts" of this matter-the allegations contained in
appellant Colafranceschi's Second Amended Complaint-are summarized as
follows.
Robinson is an LMSW (Licensed Masters Social Worker). (R. at 143, <J{3.)
Per the Second Amended Complaint, Robinson previously testified that, upon
moving to McCall, she sent the court a letter and resume detailing her experience,
offering to assist the Court. 5 (R. at 144, !J[3.) Robinson testified that she later had
lunch with Valley County Magistrate Henry R. Boomer and other county
personnel in January 2011, to discuss the prospect of doing work for the courts
and Valley County. (Id. at !J[4.) Robinson denied discussing Colafranceschi's cases
at that lunch. (Id. at !J[4.)
On February 2, 2011, Judge Boomer, in a matter entitled Mark D.

Colafranceschi v. Durena Schoonover, Valley County Case No. CV 2010-312-C
("Schoonover"),

entered an Amended Order for Child Custody Evaluation

appointing appellant Robinson to complete a child custody evaluation in that
4 Appellant Colafranceschi's "Statement of Facts/Arguements" [sic] section does not clarify that many
of the 'facts' identified - particularly as to the alleged misconduct by appellee Robinson - are merely
allegations stated in his Second Amended Complaint, and have not in any way been established or
otherwise proven in the litigation.
5 The Second Amended Complaint does not attach copies of that letter or the resume.
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case, with the cost of the home study to be shared by the parties, subject to
reapportionment. (R. at 145-146, <J{12, & 168-169.)

On February 7, 2011, Judge

Boomer, in another matter entitled Mark D. Colafranceschi v. Susie Ericson, Valley
County Case No. 06-521 ("Ericson"), entered an Amended Order for Child Custody
Evaluation appointing Robinson to complete a child custody evaluation in that
case, with the cost of the home study to be shared by the parties. (R. 171.) In both

Ericson and Schoonover the parties, including Colafranceschi, entered into a
written Informed Consent For Participants agreement with Robinson.

(R. 173-

197 .) The Agreements confirmed that child custody evaluations had been ordered
by the Court and that Robinson did not work for either parent. (Id.) The Second
Amended Complaint does not assert that appellant Colafranceschi made any
objection to the appointment of Robinson, in either matter, at the time of
appointment.
In both Ericson and Schoonover, Robinson conducted evaluations for the
purpose of making written child custody and visitation recommendations to the
Court.

(R. at 198-240.)

Robinson's evaluation(s) included interviews with the

parents and children; observations of the children with each parent; interviews of
other members of each parent's household; a review of documents and collateral
interviews of individuals who were identified by the parents.

(Id.)

Both

evaluations were filed in their respective actions on April 18, 2011. (Id.)
Judge Boomer's decision in Ericson was reheard by Judge Comstock on
August 28 and 29, 2012. (R. at 160, <J{75.) Following testimony, Judge Comstock
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ruled that Robinson was not qualified as an expert, excluding her report from
evidence. (R. at 150, <J[30.) Judge Comstock is quoted as stating:
I have some experience with the AFCC model standards. I know
there is some concern about folks that get into forensic custody
evaluation who start doing that without the careful supervision with
someone that has handled these before. She has handled them
before in the context of dependency proceedings but not in any
private civil cases involving post divorce, or divorce or custody
modification or initial custody cases it's a different analysis it's a
different type of recommendation. The end result is different
because of the legal standards that differ between dependency
proceedings and child custody law.
(Id.)

The Second Amended Complaint concedes that while asserting that Ms.

Robinson had not performed a private home study prior to appointment, she "had
done case work with foster care children and health and welfare case." (R. at 144,
<J[6.)

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did

the

District

Court

err

m

dismissing

appellant

Colafranceschi's Second Amended Complaint?
2.

Did the District Court err in denying appellant Colafranceschi's

motion to reconsider the dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint?
3.

III.

Is appellee Robinson entitled to costs if she prevails on appeal?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Appellee Robinson only seeks an award of those costs awarded as a matter of

course should she prevail, pursuant to I.A.R. 40.
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IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

The motion submitted by Appellee Robinson, and ruled upon by the District
Court, was a motion to dismiss made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 6 (R. at 296-296

& 422-423.) The applicable standard of review, as set forth by this Court, is as
follows:
The Court's standard of review for an order of the district court
dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the
summary judgment standard of review. See Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999); see also
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563
(1995). After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor
of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief
has been stated. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 398, 987 P.2d at 310. "The
issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether
the party is 'entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."' Id., citing
Orthman 126 Idaho at 962, 895 P.2d at 563, quoting Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, 96
(1974) (citation omitted).
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005) (quoting Bradbury
v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67, 28 P.3d 1006, 1010 (2001)).
Similarly, "when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the
lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153
Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).

Appellant Colafranceschi incorrectly cites the summary judgment rule, Rule 56, as the applicable
rule at issue on appeal. (Appellant's Brief at 15.)

6
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B.

The District Court's decision dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint should be affirmed.
1.

The District Court's dismissal.

In ruling upon appellee Robinson's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the District
Court summarized the allegations made by appellant Colafranceschi in his Second
Amended Complaint as follows:
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Robinson sent a letter to
the Court with her resume, offering her assistance to the Court. The
specific contents of that letter are not set forth. Within a short time
the presiding Judge in the two custody disputes in which the Plaintiff
was involved met with Robinson, along with others. Thereafter,
Robinson was appointed as the home evaluator by the presiding judge.
According to the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, "Ms. Robinson
willfully misrepresented her qualifications to the court staff. Ms.
Robinson claimed to have experience in home studies when in fact she
had never done a home study of this sort. She had done case work
with foster care children and health and welfare cases. Ms. Robinson
had never performed a private home study-like the one involved."
The Amended Complaint alleges that Robinson did not begin the
process of becoming a clinical licensed social worker until after the
custody proceedings involved.
(R. at 296-297 .)

The District Court determined that such allegations fail to

establish a cause of action against appellee Robinson in light of the quasi-judicial
immunity doctrine:
Reduced to its basics the Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Robinson
misrepresented to the Court her qualifications to perform the home
study. If that be the case, it should not have occurred. Nonetheless
that allegation does not defeat the application of the doctrine of quasijudicial immunity to the Defendant. Her background was subject to
scrutiny prior the completion of the home study. The report itself was
subject to scrutiny, and the competence of the evaluator was subject to
critical examination concerning her expertise and the contents of the
evaluation. If there were an ethical violation, that would be the
subject of review by the appropriate supervising authorities. If the
Court for which the report was prepared determined that there was
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF
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insufficient expertise to justify acceptance of the evaluation, the Court
could disregard the evaluation. The Plaintiff could challenge the facts
and conclusions of the evaluation by other evidence. In sum, there are
remedial avenues short of exposing an evaluator to open ended
litigation if there is a perceived flaw in the appointment process.
(R. at 297.) The District Court mused that there might be a loss of the immunity in
some fraudulent appointment scenario, but that appellant Colafranceschi alleged no
such facts as would preserve his action:
In high conflict custody cases there is likely discontent in many
situations. The protection of those who do such evaluations afforded
by the principle of quasi-judicial immunity is significant. It should not
be lost easily. Allegations of fraud or some other mischief in obtaining
an appointment might rise to the level of eliminating the shield,
particularly if there are no avenues to remediate the alleged
misconduct. The allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do not
rise to that level.
(R. at 297.) (emphasis added).
Quasi-judicial immunity in Idaho, generally.

2.
The Idaho

Supreme

Court recognized

the doctrine of quasi-judicial

immunity in McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 150, 937 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1997). In
McKay, the Court was asked to decide whether or not an attorney, who had been
appointed by the court as a minor's guardian ad litem, could be sued for
malpractice. 7

The attorney argued that since he had been acting as a court

appointed guardian ad litem, he was an "arm of the court" and should be granted
quasi-judicial immunity status. In examining this question, the Court applied a
"functional approach" to determine if the guardian ad litem performed a function
7 "Parenting Coordinators," also appointed in Idaho family law actions after custody orders are
entered, are expressly afforded immunity by rule. I.R.C.P. 16(l)(K)(" The Parenting Coordinator has
qualified judicial immunity in accordance with Idaho law as to all acts undertaken pursuant to and
consistent with the order of appointment.").
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related to the judicial process:
We have not previously considered this question in Idaho, but we
note that the "arm of the court" analysis stems from an analysis
employed by the United States Supreme Court. That Court stated
that it has "applied a 'functional approach' . . . which looks to 'the
nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who
performed it."' Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct.
2606, 2613, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993) (citations omitted). Therefore,
the question becomes whether a guardian ad litem, acting under I.C.
§ 5-306, is functioning as an arm of the court.
McKay, 130 Idaho at 156, 937 P.2d at 1230. In applying the "functional analysis"
to a guardian's duties, the Court found:
Using the functional analysis employed by the United States
Supreme Court, the guardian's duty under LC. § 5-306 is to consider
all of the alternatives and give its recommendation to the Court
based on what will be best for the ward. Therefore, the guardian can
be seen as an "agent of the court."

Id. at 157, 937 P.2d at 1231 (citations omitted). Having found that a courtappointed guardian was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the McKay Court then
examined the policies behind quasi-judicial immunity:
Although I.C. § 5-306 itself, and the proceedings below, do not
provide a clear-cut answer to the issue, the policies behind quasijudicial immunity lead us to the conclusion that guardians under
I.C. § 5-306 should be given absolute quasi- judicial immunity. The
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that although a guardian may even
act as an advocate to some degree, quasi-judicial immunity is not
inappropriate. Specifically, that court held that:
A guardian ad litem is an officer of the court. The guardian's
duty is to act within the course of that judicial proceeding
in furtherance of the best interests of the child for whom
the guardian has been appointed. A guardian must be
free,
in furtherance
of the
goal for
which the
appointment was made, to engage in a vigorous and
autonomous representation of the child.
Immunity
is
necessary to avoid harassment from disgruntled parents
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF - 9

who may take ISsue with any or all of the guardian's
actions.
Tindell v. Rogosheske. 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988) (citations
omitted). Similarly, although written in the context of a custody
dispute, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
stated that:
[t]o safeguard the best interests of the children, [ ],
the guardian's judgment must remain impartial, unaltered
by the intimidating
wrath and litigious penchant of
disgruntled parents. Fear of liability ... can warp judgment
that is crucial to vigilant loyalty for what is best for the
child; the guardian's focus must not be diverted to
appeasement of antagonistic parents.
Short (ex rel.
Oosterhous v. Short], 730 F. Supp. [1037,] at 1039 [(D. Colo.
1990)]. Further, qualified attorneys might be unwilling to
represent a child if "disgruntled or vituperative parents could
hold the guardian ad litem personally responsible." Delcourt
(v. Silverman], 919 S.W.2d [777,] at 785 [(Tex. App. 1996)].

Id. at 157-58.
More recently, in Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 345 (2012), the
Court evaluated whether, once a judicial appointment was terminated by the Court,
immunity continued to exist to bar an award of appeal costs against a former
guardian who elected to appeal a court decision after his termination as guardian:
After considering the comments by the parties and their respective
counsel and Adler's comments, the magistrate court stated that it
accepted the stipulation, and it orally granted the motion to terminate
Adler as guardian ad litem. On February 15, 2008, the court entered
the order terminating Adler as guardian ad litem and the order
modifying the divorce decree pursuant to the parties' stipulation.
On March 21, 2008, Adler, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal,
stating that he was appealing from the order modifying the divorce
decree and from the order terminating him as guardian ad litem.

Id. at 901, 277 P.3d at 348. The Court further held that no such immunity survived
post-termination:
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF - 10

Finally, Adler argues that while discharging his duties as guardian ad
litem, he had quasi-immunity that protected him from an award of
attorney fees. In making that argument, he relies upon McKay v.
Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997). In McKay, an attorney
was appointed pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-306 as a child's
guardian ad litem in order to make recommendations to the court
regarding the proposed settlement of the child's personal injury action.
We held that a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Idaho Code
section 5-306 to represent a child who was a party in a personal injury
action had absolute quasi-immunity because the guardian must be free
to make recommendations to the court that the guardian believes are
in the child's best interests. Id. at 157, 937 P.2d at 1231. That case
does not support quasi-immunity here because Adler was not guardian
ad litem for the children at the time he filed his appeal.

The discussion between Adler and the Court continued, and Adler
correctly stated, "I serve at the pleasure of the court." When the court
did not do what Adler wanted, he decided that he served at his own
pleasure and filed the appeal. The sole purpose of the appeal was to
assuage his hurt pride. He has provided absolutely no argument or
authority that would even remotely support his assertion that he has
standing to appeal. All he has done is increase the cost to the parties.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father and
Mother attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121
on the ground that Adler brought this appeal unreasonably and
without foundation.

Id. at 905, 277 P.3d at 352.
3.

Appellant Robinson is protected by quasi-judicial immunity,
including the appointment process.
a.

Immunity appropriately extends to the appointment
process and to evaluators such as Ms. Robinson.

In this action, appellee Colafranceschi attempts to carve out from quasijudicial immunity a key and necessary portion of appellee Robinson's service as an
"arm of the court"-the appointment process. While the Idaho Supreme Court has
made clear in Abolafia that immunity ceases at what should be a readily-apparent
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF
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point (the juncture at which the court terminates the appointment), nothing in
either the McKay and Abolafia decision suggest any limitation on the immunity for
the appointment process, which is part and parcel of the services provided by the
appointee.
This issue of immunity in the appointment process was recently explored in
California, in La Serena Properties v. Weisbach, 186 Cal. App. 4th 893, 905, 112
Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 605 (2010). In La Serena, the California Court of Appeal (1st
District) examined the question of whether an arbitrator, who allegedly deliberately
concealed a conflict in order to secure consent to serve as an arbitrator, was
precluded from asserting the immunity. The La Serena Court rejected the claim
attempting to defeat immunity on alleged defects in appointment, discussing other
authority, and noting:
As to appellants' argument that the arbitral immunity should not be
applied because the failure to disclose occurred, before the
decisionmaking process began, this same contention was made by the
plaintiff in Olson [v. Nat'l Ass'n Securities Dealers], supra, 85 F.3d 381
[(8 th Cir. 1996)]. The court rejected the argument concluding that "[t]he
appointment of arbitrators is a necessary part of arbitration
administration, however, and thus is protected by arbitral immunity."
(Id. at p. 383.)
This rationale is compelling and equally applicable here. While
disclosures take place before the arbitrator's appointment becomes
final, and certainly before the commencement of the arbitration itself,
it is an integral part of the arbitration process. Indeed, the rules and
statutes governing the disclosures by arbitrators make it clear that
such disclosures are to occur when the arbitrator is "proposed."
Similarly, judges are expected to make the disclosures required of
them before the adjudicative function of the courts begin. (Rothman,
California Judicial Conduct Handbook (3d ed. 2007) Appen. F, pp. 4-6.)
Indeed, we have been reminded recently that a judge's disqualification
"occurs when the facts creating disqualification arise, not when
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF - 12

disqualification is established. [Citations.]" (Christie v. City of El
Centro (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 767, 776, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718.)
Therefore, any claimed misconduct by the arbitrator in association
with the failure to make a required disclosure at the inception of his or
her selection was sufficiently associated with the arbitration process
itself to justify the application of arbitral immunity.
La Serena, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 905, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 605. The court further
buttressed this decision by noting that, "[i]n other contexts, similar attempts by
plaintiffs to avoid an immunity or privilege by creative pleading have been rejected
uniformly by courts." Id. at 906, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 606. Thus, the La Serena
Court considered the appointment process (and any defects therein) to still be
within the scope of the immunity. The same would be true in the context of the
appointment of a court-appointed evaluator, as here, which, as a matter of the basic
appointment process, requires an initial evaluation by the Court as to the
appropriateness of an individual for appointment.
Additionally, the California Court of Appeal (1st District), even more
recently, reaffirmed that the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine generally extended to
child custody evaluators. In Bergeron v. Boyd, 223 Cal. App. 4 th 877, 167 Cal. Rptr.
3d 426 (2014), a parent, unhappy with reporting and orders by a child custody
evaluator, filed suit, asserting the evaluator failed to perform appropriately,
including the assertion that the evaluator failed to be properly appointed as the
Court's expert under California Evidence Code section 730. Id. at 882, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 431.

Discussing an earlier decision, Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App.

3d 843, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1990), the Bergeron court explained:
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The principle case authority discussing the evolution of the common
law quasi-judicial privilege in California, and one factually similar to
the instant case, is Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 843,
271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Howard). In Howard, the defendant was a
psychologist who was sued by a disgruntled parent/family court
litigant after performing a child custody evaluation. After tracing the
history and rationale for the common law development of a quasijudicial privilege, the Court of Appeal concluded that persons
performing acts that are judicial in nature are protected by the
privilege. In making this determination, the court emphasized that it
is the act performed, not the title of the person performing it, which is
determinative: "So also, in determining whether a person is acting in a
quasi-judicial fashion, the courts look at 'the nature of the duty
performed [to determine] whether it is a judicial act-not the name or
classification of the officer who performs it, and many who are properly
classified as executive officers are invested with limited judicial
powers.' (Pearson v. Reed [ (1935) ] 6 Cal. App. 2d [277,] 286-287, 44
P.2d 592.)" (Howard, supra, at p. 853, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893.)
Turning to the function of the family law custody evaluator in that
case, the Howard court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to analogize the
action to one for professional malpractice: "In contrast, the psychologist
who is mediating a child custody dispute, whether by court
appointment or not, is not an advocate for either parent, even if paid
by them. [Citation.] The job of third parties such as mediators,
conciliators and evaluators involves impartiality and neutrality, as
does that of a judge, commissioner or referee; hence, there should be
entitlement to the same immunity given others who function as
neutrals in an attempt to resolve disputes. In a sense, those persons
are similar to a judge who is handling a voluntary or mandatory
settlement conference, no matter whether they are (1) making binding
decisions (such as referees acting pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 638,
subd. (1), and arbitrators), (2) making recommendations to the court
(such as referees acting under Code Civ. Proc., § 639 or mediators
acting under Civ. Code, § 4607), or (3) privately attempting to settle
disputes, such as the defendant here. [<J[] We therefore hold that
absolute quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to these neutral
third parties for their conduct in performing dispute resolution services
which are connected to the judicial process and involve either (1) the
making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings or
recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration, mediation,
conciliation, evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes.
As the defendant was clearly engaged in this latter activity, she is
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entitled to the protection of such quasi-judicial immunity." (Howard,
supra, 222 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 859-860, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893.)
Bergeron v. Boyd, 223 Cal. App. 4th at 884-85. The Howard decision referred to by
the Bergeron Court explained the public policy rationale, as quoted by the Bergeron
court:
As the Howard court explained later in its opinion, it is the function
being exercised by the immunized individual that is the focus of the
privilege's application and not the status or capacity of the individual
that controls. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 853-855, 271
Cal. Rptr. 893.) The reasons for doing so are clear: "We are persuaded
that the approach of the federal courts is consistent with the relevant
policy considerations of attracting to an overburdened judicial system
the independent and impartial services and expertise upon which that
system necessarily depends. Thus, we believe it appropriate that these
'nonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately
related to the judicial process' [citation] should be given absolute
quasi-judicial immunity for damage claims arising from their
performance of duties in connection with the judicial process. Without
such immunity, such persons will be reluctant to accept court
appointments or provide work product for the courts' use.
Additionally, the threat of civil liability may affect the manner
in which they perform their jobs. [Citation.]"
Bergeron v. Boyd, 223 Cal. App. 4th at 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 431 (emphasis
added).
This echoes the Idaho Supreme Court's discussion of policy concerns in the
McKay decision, which ruling does not suggest avenues to sue individuals appointed
by the Court because of alleged defects at any time during the appointment and
service of that individual: "It is absolutely essential that guardians are free to make
such a determination, without fear that a parent, seeking a larger award or
settlement amount, will later sue the guardian for legal malpractice." McKay, 130
Idaho at 158.

Ensuring that the cloak of immunity also encapsulates the
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appointment process advances the ultimate goal intended by the Idaho Supreme
Court. Undermining this policy, by allowing the kind of "creative pleading" warned
of in La Serena, would invite chaos in the form of lawsuits against court-appointed
individuals based simply upon bare allegations of defects in the appointment
process and likely cripple the ability of Idaho courts (especially those in rural
counties with limited expert pools to draw from) to secure the aid of guardians,
evaluators, and similar personnel who are critical in aiding the courts to make
sound and well-informed determinations, especially in family law matters.
Moreover, the emphasis on ensuring that evaluators are protected by quasijudicial immunity was also discussed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Lythgoe v.
Gunn, 884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994).

In that matter, a court-appointed custody

investigator was appointed in a divorce and custody proceeding.

Id. at 1086.

During the course of the proceeding, the investigator's reports and testimony were
ultimately stricken apparently based upon qualification concerns, and one party
sued the investigator:
In early 1992 the superior court Judge Andrews appointed Dr. Janet
Guinn as an independent custody investigator in a divorce and custody
proceeding involving Jacqueline Lythgoe, her ex-husband Paul
Wellman, and their six-year-old son,
Under the terms of this
appointment, the parties were each required to pay half of the costs
and fees incurred by the investigator. The court further ordered the
parties to fully cooperate with Dr. Guinn's investigation. Dr. Guinn's
report recommended that Wellman be given sole custody of the child.
Lythgoe filed a motion requesting that a separate evaluation be
performed, which was granted. Judge Andrews also ordered an in
camera review of files maintained by the State Division of
Occupational Licensing pertaining to an investigation of Dr. Guinn "to
determine if there are any relevant documents ... relating to Guinn's
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF
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qualifications or the weight to give her report or testimony." Following
this inspection, the court ordered that "all reports and testimony
produced by Dr. Guinn be stricken from the record." The court further
directed that none of the documents produced by Dr. Guinn be
provided to the new custody evaluator.
In October 1992 Lythgoe filed suit against Dr. Guinn, alleging that she
performed the custody investigation negligently, willfully and
wantonly, that she intentionally or negligently misrepresented
statements of third parties in her report, that she failed to conform to
the minimum professional standards for licensed psychologists in the
State of Alaska, that she violated statutes governing such
professionals, and that she breached her fiduciary duties to Lythgoe. In
an amended complaint, Lythgoe further alleged that Dr. Guinn acted
as an advocate for Wellman, thereby forfeiting any immunity she
might have had.

Id. The court granted immunity to the appointed psychologist, irrespective of the
ultimate exclusion of her opinions and report, confirming the underlying public
policy grounds for the granting of immunity:
On the contrary, several courts have noted that adequate remedies and
safeguards, other than civil liability, exist to hold court-appointed
experts accountable for their actions. For example, in LaLonde
[Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1989)], the court stated that
"[w]hile we are cognizant of the need to prevent negligently performed
evaluations, our judicial system has inherent safeguards that minimize
the risk of decisions based on inaccurate, misleading, or negligently
conducted evaluations." In particular, the court noted that, where the
expert testifies or the expert's report is presented to the court, the
complaining party has the opportunity to examine the expert and bring
to the judge's attention any alleged deficiencies in the evaluation. In
addition, the court further noted that the complaining party is "free to
seek appellate review or ... request a modification of the [trial court's]
order."

In the present case, Lythgoe successfully availed herself of such
alternative remedies. She deposed Dr. Guinn and presented her
objections to the trial court, which issued an order that Dr. Guinn's
report be stricken from the record. She additionally would have had
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the opportunity to seek appellate review had the trial court denied her
motion to exclude Dr. Guinn's report. These alternative mechanisms
for review are "largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably
associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers] to personal
liability." Thus, Lythgoe's public policy argument is unpersuasive.

Id. at 1091 (internal citations omitted). Lythgoe is factually similar to this matter,
and demonstrates that, as here, the remedy for allegedly unqualified individuals
and/or deficient evaluations is through exclusion of the witness, appeal, etc. 8 In
fact, here, appellant Colafranceschi even specifically asserts that Robinson was
excluded as an expert on Rule 702 grounds, precisely the kind of remedy
contemplated by Lythgoe in lieu of civil litigation. 9 (R. at 150, <J[30.)
Similarly, Colafranceschi complains that Robinson was "converted to the
defense expert witness," both in light of her testimony and alleged preparation by
As an aside, this Court recently affirmed a lower court's partial rejection of a custody evaluator's
recommendations on Rule 702 grounds. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 286-287, 281 P.3d 115, 123124 (2012). Interestingly, the Clair decision quotes the magistrate in the underlying proceeding, who
himself appeared to question what standards (AFCC, APA, or otherwise) might apply to evaluations
(which AFCC standards were also discussed in the exclusion of Ms. Robinson): "The foundation for
some opinion testimony at this point is lacking in my view because I don't think we quite got there to
whether there are or are not commonly accepted criteria or standards in the counseling field on how
to conduct a child custody evaluation whether nationally or locally. Our State Legislature and our
Supreme Court has not gone along yet with the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts to
adopt the model Standards of Practice. I don't know at this juncture what the American
Psychological Association or any other national association say the guidelines for the conduct of child
custody evaluations are or what they should be in comparison to what Dr. Vereen has done here."
Id. at 287; R. at 150, <]{30.
9 Appellant Colafranceschi offers the inapposite hypothetical analogue of a non-lawyer somehow
becoming a judge, thereby lacking "judicial immunity." (Appellant's Brief at 7.) While such a person
is likely still considered to have acted as a judge (see, e.g., Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89
S.W.3d 643, 651 (Tex. App. 2002) (regarding challenge to judge alleged to lack a law license: "When a
judge is holding office under the color of law and discharging his duties of office, his acts are
conclusive as to all parties and cannot be attacked in an appeal, even though the person acting as
judge lacks the necessary qualifications and is incapable of legally holding the office.")), a more
correct analogy in this instance would be an attorney who secured a family law magistrate seat,
having told the magistrate commission of his/her experience in family law, but is ultimately revealed
(after taking the bench) to have only done adoptions and uncontested divorces, but never any
contested child custody proceedings. While there certainly might be an investigation by the Idaho
Judicial Council, and appellate review of those matters handled by the judge, the lack of on-point
experience does not invalidate the person's position on the bench so as to waive his/her immunity.
8
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opposmg counsel, thereby having "no jurisdiction in this matter"-presumably a
waiver argument.

(R. at 155, <J[<J[42, 51-52, & 59.)

This argument, in essence,

contends that Robinson waived quasi-judicial immunity through advocacy for the
defendants. The Lythgoe court, however, also rejected a similar "waiver by
advocacy" argument:
Lythgoe also argues that Dr. Guinn abandoned her neutral role and
assumed the role of an advocate for Wellman, thereby waiving any
immunity to which Guinn was entitled .... In the present case, all of
Lythgoe's allegations arise from Dr. Guinn's role as a court-appointed
custody investigator .... To accept Lythgoe's argument would render
quasi-judicial immunity meaningless and defeat the purposes
underlying the doctrine, as it would open the door to allegations of
waiver by advocacy in every case where the quasi-judicial officer
makes a recommendation contrary to a party's position.

Id. at 1092. Thus, appellant's argument on this point fails, as well.
b.

Other appropriate remedies-other than loss of
immunity-can address conduct by, and I or deficiencies
with, court-appointed personnel.

Concerns about failures by such court-appointed personnel are adequately
addressed through other mechanisms, which keep such personnel professionally
responsible and further ensure that the integrity of the court actions they serve in is
maintained. As noted above, Judge Schroeder explained that, in Idaho, "there are
remedial avenues short of exposing an evaluator to open ended litigation if there is
a perceived flaw in the appointment process." (R. at 297.) Remedial measures that
could be applied to court-appointed personnel were discussed in another California
decision, as well, in the context of guardians ad litem:
The countervailing policy present here is the accountability of
guardians ad litem, but there are sufficient mechanisms in place to
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address such concerns. First, immunity is limited to acts within the
scope of the guardian's authority. Second, in addition to a guardian ad
litem, wards generally have legal counsel as well, as was the case here.
Third, as we have noted, guardians ad litem are appointed by and
subject to the supervision of the trial court. The trial court can remove
a guardian if he or she is not performing responsibly, either on its own
motion or at a party's request. Fourth, the trial court's decisions are
ultimately subject to review by an appropriate writ or appeal.
Ultimately, both the parties and the judicial system are best served by
addressing any issues with the guardian ad litem's performance during
the initial case, rather than by a subsequent lawsuit collaterally
attacking the original judgment.
McClintock v. W., 219 Cal. App. 4th 540, 552, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 70 (2013).
The availability of remedial avenues in an action such as appellant's is even
born out by the fact that Colafranceschi's argument remains predicated on the
court's ultimate rejection of Robinson as an expert by Judge Comstock based upon
Rule 702 concerns. (R. at 150, <J[30.) 10 Thus, immunity is appropriately afforded,
given that the more appropriate avenue for challenging the ability of an expert to
testify on experience grounds is via a motion to exclude based upon Rule 702, not
via a lawsuit. See Lythgoe v. Gunn, 884 P.2d at 1091 ("On the contrary, several
courts have noted that adequate remedies and safeguards, other than civil liability,
exist to hold court-appointed experts accountable for their actions. . .. These
alternative mechanisms for review are 'largely free of the harmful side-effects
inevitably associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers] to personal
liability."').

10 Note that the rejection of appellee Robinson as an expert under Rule 702, as alleged, was not
predicated on any kind of misrepresentation regarding her history of performing custodial
evaluations prior to her appointment, but instead is alleged to have been based upon Judge
Comstock's finding that additional experience in a specific subset of custodial evaluations was
required. (R. at 150, '1[30.)
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The

allegations

of the

Second Amended

Complaint,

and

appellant

Colafranceschi's arguments on appeal, both highlight the concerns about openended litigation, and the availability of alternative remedies. Contrary to appellant
Colafranceschi's assertions, this litigation does not merely assert that Ms. Robinson
(and Ms. Briley) fraudulently obtained an evaluator appointment that resulted in a
paid-for home study to be thrown out; instead, the Second Amended Complaint
contains far more wide-ranging allegations, including:
•

A complaint about the process for transporting the child to interviews (R.
151, <J[37);

•

A broad string-citation to multiple sections of the "Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts Model Standards of Practice for Child Custody
Evaluation" (R. at 152, <J[38);

•

Complaints about Robinson's pre-hearing preparation with attorney Todd
Wilcox (R. at 153, <J[<J[39 & 42);

•

The assertion that Robinson launched a "negligence and defamation
campaign" during her appointment (R. at 153, <J[40);

•

Complaints about Robinson's payment policy (R. 153-154, <J[<J[45-47);

•

Complaints about Robinson contacting McCall police regarding harassment
by Colafranceschi (R. at 155, <J[50);

•

A dispute regarding the contents of the Robinson's report re: the likelihood of
Colafranceschi to kidnap his children (R. at 157, <J[<J[59, 84, & 87);
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•

Allegations that co-defendant/appellee Shawn Briley "has a long history of
domestic violence and fabricating frivolous claims against the father of her
own child," including alleged details of an arrest for domestic violence (R. at
158, !][!][64-65; 160, !][77);

•

An allegation that co-defendant/appellee Shawn Briley offered him beer in
2010 (R. at 160, 1[78);

•

A dispute regarding the handling of an alleged statement by Robinson that
one child wanted to kill his father (R. at 161, 1[1[85-86);

•

A complaint that Robinson (and Briley) had "failed to investigate the majority
of instances of abuse directed to child by mother, along with parental
alienation by mother and harassment of plaintiff' (R. at 162, 1[88);

•

Complaints regarding alleged coaching of a child's testimony by the mother,
and

an

asserted

lack

of

consistency

between

Colafranceschi's

"pleadings/complaint" and "the statements made by child in interview with
Ashley Robinson" (R. at 162-163, 1[1[91-92)
•

A dispute regarding a particular course of events reported in Robinson's
report involving an alleged school disruption by Colafranceschi in 2006 (R. at
163, 1[93); and

•

A dispute regarding the suitability of certain babysitters. (R. at 163, 1[94.)

Thus, the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do, in fact, seek to
essentially revisit several disputes in the underlying family law action-despite the
fact that such complaints, disputes, and allegations are more appropriately raised
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in that family law action. Indeed, Robinson's expert status itself was successfully
challenged on Rule 702 grounds in the underlying family law action.
Appellant Colafranceschi, apparently recognizing the fact that there are, in
fact, other remedial measures, instead argues that this action is forced by the lack
of ability to recover home study costs: "The home studies were ultimately not used
in either child custody case and are therefore deemed a waste of money for plaintiff.
. . . In the case of a magistrate excluding a home study where the evaluators
attained the position correctly there is no recourse to recoup the money for the
evaluation that was not used. . . . Plaintiff has not been able to recover from the
financial loss of paying for home evaluations." (Appellants' Brief at 6 & 13.) Of
course, this is unfounded-the family law court sets responsibility for costs for the
home evaluation, can reserve the right to reapportion, and has the presumptive
discretionary power to direct a return of payments by the evaluator or otherwise
excuse payment by the parties) if appropriate (e.g., failure to complete evaluation,
termination of appointment based on conduct, etc.). (R. at 169 & 171.) 11
The sole authority cited by appellant Colafranceschi-an unpublished 12
decision from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, Kuberka v. Anoka Mediation, Inc.,
No. A05-2490, 2007 WL 3525 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007)-does not dictate a

While not part of the record in this matter, the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that, after
the instant appeal was filed, appellant Colafranceschi sought a return of home study fees in the
Schoonover matter (Valley County Case No. 10-312) via motion filed January 14, 2014, as reflected
in the Repository. In light of the District Court decision and appeal in this instant action, Robinson
(and Briley) intervened, opposing such motion. As per the Repository, the District Court ultimately
denied Colafranceschi's motion, and awarded fees and costs to Robinson and Briley. The Repository
does not appear to reflect any similar motion made at any time in the Ericson matter.
12 In Minnesota, by statute, unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions are not precedential
and cannot be cited as precedent. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08(3).
11
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different result as to application of the immunity. In Kuberka, the defendant was
retained by plaintiff as a private mediator in divorce proceedings. Id. at *l. The
defendant was subsequently selected by stipulation of the plaintiff and his wife as a
time expeditor in determining child custody. Id. Subsequently, the court appointed
defendant as a custody evaluator based upon the defendant's representation to the
court that she was nearly done with her evaluation. Id. The plaintiff then filed suit
against the defendant, alleging that she made misrepresentations concerning her
evaluation in order to obtain appointment as a custody evaluator.

Id. The

defendant sought summary judgment on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Id.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of a district court to
deny a summary judgment motion made on immunity grounds based upon the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding misrepresentations in the
appointment of a custody evaluator and challenged conduct beyond the scope of the
duties of the evaluator. The Kuberka court held that, in that matter, "the proper
focus regarding securing the appointment is not on [defendant's] individual acts as
the evaluator, but on the actions she undertook to become the evaluator, before
immunity would attach."

Id.

In particular, the court expressed concern about

"whether [defendant] misrepresented her qualifications to the court and the
[plaintiff]" prior to her appointment. Id. Nothing in the Idaho decision of McKay
(nor La Serena nor Lythgoe) suggest that the appointment process itself is beyond
the scope of the immunity.

Moreover, as discussed above, the Kuberka case 1s

factually different in terms of the allegations regarding appointment.
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Accordingly, even while appellant Colafranceschi seeks to predicate his
litigation upon claimed defects in the appointment process, the scope of the quasijudicial immunity still applies, and the District Court's dismissal of Colafranceschi's
action should be affirmed.
4.

Even were there an exception to immunity recognized in Idaho.
appellant Colafranceschi failed to plead appropriate facts in
support of such an exception.

As above, the quasi-judicial immunity extends to the appointment process,
as correctly held by Judge Schroeder.

Even were this Court to narrow the

immunity to not include the appointment process, however, the Second Amended
Complaint fails to adequately plead allegations that would sustain appellant
Colafranceschi's action against appellee Robinson. See, e.g., Anderson & Nafziger
v. G. T. Newcomb. Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979) ("This Court
has generally held that where an order of a lower court is correct but is based upon
an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory.").
The Second Amended Complaint is devoid of allegations that Robinson
proactively sought appointment to Colafranceschi's actions for the particular
evaluations at issue. To the contrary, the allegations of the Complaint only assert
that (1) Ms. Robinson sent a letter to the court with a resume detailing her
experience and offering her assistance (R. at 143-144, 1JHI2-3) 13 ; (2) Ms. Robinson
went to lunch with Judge Boomer and others in January 2011 (R. at 144, <JI<JI4-6);
and (3) at that lunch, did not speak about Colafranceschi's case. (Id.) This course

13 The Second Amended Complaint is unclear on what specific misrepresentations were allegedly
made in Ms. Robinson's letter or resume.
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of conducted can be readily contrasted with the differing fact pattern in Kuberka,
discussed above, wherein the defendant made specific representations to the
plaintiff and the court concerning her qualifications and the status of her evaluation
in the course of obtaining appointment as the evaluator. 2007 WL 3525, at *l.
Here, the primary allegation that appears to allege misrepresentation by
Robinson is confusing and would otherwise fail to satisfy the specificity
requirements of Rule 9. Colafranceschi asserts that:
6. Early January 2011 at a lunch that included Judge Boomer,
Ashley Robinson, Doug Miller and Carol Brockman, Ms. Robinson
willfully misrepresented her qualifications to the court staff. Ms.
Robinson claimed to have experience in home studies when in fact she
had never done a home study of this sort. She had done case work
with foster care children and health and welfare case [sic]. Ms.
Robinson had never performed a private home study-like the one
involved. Ms. Robinson perjured herself by stating otherwise under
oath at the August 29 th 2012 hearing.
(R. at 144, <]{6.) Thus, Colafranceschi simultaneously concedes that Robinson does
have casework experience (accord, R. at 160, <]{79), but then complains that
Robinson had not done one "of this sort" or "like the one involved." Ultimately, the
Second Amended Complaint is devoid of two basic allegations. First, there is no
allegation that Robinson specifically misrepresented her ability to perform the
specific assignments in the Ericson and Schoonover matters before the assignments.
In

fact,

the

Second

Amended

Complaint

acknowledges

that

appellant

Colafranceschi was not discussed prior to appointment according to appellee
Robinson.

(R. at 144, <]{4-"Ms. Robinson denied talking about plaintiff during

lunch.") Instead, the complaint only asserts that Judge Boomer himself believed
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she was qualified at the time of appointment (R. at 145-146, <J[12) based upon his
own understanding (rather than any specific representation she made regarding her
suitability to be appointed to those two specific matters for the specific evaluations
to be made).
Second, appellant Colafranceschi's argument remams predicated on the
court's ultimate rejection of Robinson as an expert by Judge Comstock based upon
Rule 702 concerns. (e.g., R. at 150, <j{30) The rejection of Robinson as an expert
under Rule 702, as alleged, was not predicated on any kind of misrepresentation
made by her based upon her history of performing custodial evaluations prior to her
appointment, but instead is alleged to have been based upon Judge Comstock's
finding that, based upon different legal standards, additional experience in a
specific subset of custodial evaluations would be required.

(Id.) In this context,

immunity has been afforded, as the appropriate avenue for challenging an expert on
experience grounds is via a motion to exclude based upon Rule 702, not via a
lawsuit-which was done by Colafranceschi. See Lythgoe, 884 P.2d at 1091 ("On
the contrary, several courts have noted that adequate remedies and safeguards,
other than civil liability, exist to hold court-appointed experts accountable for their
actions .... These alternative mechanisms for review are 'largely free of the harmful
side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers]
to personal liability."').
As such, even were Idaho to recognize an exception to immunity based upon
pre-appointment misrepresentations like those made in the Kuberka matter,
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appellant Colafranceschi's Second Amended Complaint still fails to allege
sufficient facts and the action against Robinson was appropriately dismissed. That
decision by the District Court should be affirmed.

C.

The District Court's decision denying the Motion to Reconsider
should be affirmed.
1.

Appellant Colafranceschi has waived this assignment of error.

In his Notice of Appeal (R. at 313), appellant Colafranceschi indicates that he
1s also appealing the "Order Denying Motion to Reconsider dated 11/05/2013"
(which order is located at R. 307); however, Appellant's brief appears devoid of any
argument and/or cited authority relating thereto.
For that reason, this Court should deem such assignment of error waived.

See, e.g., Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558, 564-65, 314 P.3d
613, 619-20 (2013) ("'When issues on appeal are not supported by positions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.' An assignment of error is
deemed waived, and will not be discussed if there is no argument contained in the
appellant's brief. This Court holds that 'a party waives an issue cited on appeal if
either argument or authority is lacking.'") (internal citations omitted).

2.

The Motion
dismissed.

to

Reconsider

was

otherwise

appropriately

In rejecting appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration, the Court
noted the lack of any new information:
The motion is supported by a reiteration of the facts and law
previously submitted to the Court in opposition to the motions to
dismiss ....
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There are no new facts alleged or previously uncited authority brought
to the attention of the Court to alter the outcome of the Court's prior
rulings. The authority cited by the Plaintiff and the arguments of the
Plaintiff have been considered by the Court. Oral argument has
previously been made based upon those alleged facts and the cited
authority. Further hearing and oral argument upon the same record
and authorities would serve no purpose but would add to the expense
of the litigation.
(R. at 307.)
Rule ll(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part:
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court
may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later
than fourteen (14) days after the entry of final judgment.

Id. When considering a motion for reconsideration, the Court may take into account
any new or additional facts presented by the moving party. Coeur d'Alene Mining
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 824, 800 P.2d 1026, 1038
(1990). In submitting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule ll(a)(2)(B), the
moving party has the burden of bringing to the Court's attention through affidavit,
depositions or admissions, new facts bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory
order. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho
202, 205, 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994); Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 824,
800 P.2d at 1038 ("The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's
attention to the new facts."); accord, Johnson v. N. Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62,
278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012)("A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the
court-when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are
applied to previously presented law, or any combination thereof-to reconsider the
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correctness of an interlocutory order.").

Even where a movmg party does not

present any new facts, it must still demonstrate "errors of law or fact in the initial
decision." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 14 7 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006).
Appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration (R. at 300-306) largely
reiterated those contentions previously made against appellee Robinson in the
Second Amended Complaint, which relate (in relevant part) to the contention that
Ms. Robinson misrepresented her qualifications to a court to secure appointment as
a custody evaluator in conjunction with allegations of improper conduct during
appointment. (See generally, Second Amended Verified Complaint, R. at 143-151,
<J[<J[l-36 re: prior to appointment; and R. at 151-163, <]1<]137-95 re: after appointment).
Appellant Colafranceschi also attempted to argue a lack of remedial avenues, but
identified only claimed categories of harm with remedial avenues, akin to those
already addressed by the Court's order dismissing the action, including: claimed
unethical conduct (addressable through a professional board), cost of the home
study (addressable through the court directing payment of such cost), and
ambiguous defamation and malpractice claims (addressable through a professional
board and/or through challenge to testimony and report in the handling court). (R.
at 297.)

Appellant Colafranceschi even reiterated the fact that he successfully

excluded Ms. Robinson's reports in the underlying actions. (R. at 306.)
Moreover, appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration also failed to
appropriately identify any errors of law and/or fact that would support a motion for
reconsideration.

First, with respect to errors of law and/or new law, appellant
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Colafranceschi only re-cited Kuberka, failing to identify any error of law in the
Court's Order, instead just arguing that Kuberka dictates a different result, and
stating that he "disagrees" with the Court's decision regarding quasi-judicial
immunity. (R. at 301.) With respect to errors of fact, appellant Colafranceschi does
not identify any particular facts identified by the Court that were purportedly in
error; instead, he appears to primarily assert that certain "facts" were not
adequately discussed in the Order. The Order, however, evaluates the allegations
of the Second Amended Verified Complaint in sufficient summary fashion (R. at
296-297), and nothing suggests that any fact was incorrectly construed by the
Court.
As such, even were this Court to deem this assignment of error not waived by
appellant, there is otherwise no error, and the decision of the District Court denying
appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration should be affirmed.

D.

Appellee Robinson is entitled to her costs on appeal.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40, "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the
Court." In this matter, Ms. Robinson should be found to be the prevailing party
because the claims asserted against by appellant Colafranceschi are precluded by
the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity and Colafranceschi's failure to plead
sufficient facts to state a claim for misrepresentation as required by Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), providing this Court with ample basis to affirm the order of
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the District Court. As such, appellee Robinson is entitled to her costs on appeal in
this matter, in an amount to be proven to the Court.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the September 16, 2013, Order Dismissing the

Second Amended Verified Complaint, and the November 5, 2013 Order Denying
Motion to Reconsider, should be affirmed, and appellee Ashley Robinson should be
awarded her costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I{

day of September, 2014.

DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
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